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Abstract
Urban congestion causes travel times to exhibit considerable variability,
which leads to coordination problems when people have to meet. We ana-
lyze a game for the timing of a meeting between two players who must each
complete a trip of random duration to reach the meeting, which does not
begin until both are present. Players prefer to depart later and also to arrive
sooner, provided they do not have to wait for the other player. We find a
unique Nash equilibrium, and a continuum of Pareto optima that are strictly
better than the Nash equilibrium for both players. Pareto optima may be
implemented as Nash equilibria by penalty or compensation schemes.
Keywords: congestion; random travel time variability; coordination game
JEL codes: C7, D1, R4
∗We thank Richard Arnott for comments and not least the referees who have been very con-
structive and helpful. Mogens Fosgerau has received support from the Danish Strategic Research
Council.
†Technical University of Denmark, Denmark, and Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.
mf@transport.dtu.dk
‡Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden
§Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden
1
1 Introduction
Urban traffic congestion is a significant burden on developed economies. As most
people know from experience, the costs of congestion are not only related to the
(average) delay. The difficulty or even impossibility of predicting travel time is
also an inherent feature of urban congestion and should be taken into account by
economic analysis.1
Many efforts to incorporate the cost of random delays into policy assessment
have drawn on a model of preferences regarding the timing and duration of a trip.
Such scheduling preferences were first introduced in Vickrey (1969, 1973) with
Small (1982) providing the first empirical estimates.2 This has led to a substantial
literature on the value of random travel time variability. This literature considers
a traveler about to undertake a trip where the travel time is random; he chooses
departure time to maximize expected utility, where utility depends on the depar-
ture time and the arrival time. It is then possible to examine how indirect utility
depends on the distribution of random travel time.3
When we take into consideration that a traveler might be on his way to a meet-
ing of some kind, it becomes clear that there are interactions involved that seem
quite important. There are many situations where this is relevant. We can think
of meetings at work, appointments with friends and family, a date with a potential
partner or generally any situation where people have to meet. These interactions
1Random delays are often related to traffic incidents such as accidents. According to one esti-
mate (Schrank and Lomax, 2009, Appendix B, p. B-27), incident-related delays alone contribute
52 - 58 percent of total delay in urban areas in the United States. On bad days, delay can easily be
as large as undelayed travel time itself (Fosgerau and Fukuda, 2012).
2Vickrey (1969, 1973) introduced two specific forms of scheduling preferences in the context
of the bottleneck model, de Palma and Fosgerau (2011) discuss a general form.
3See, among others, Noland and Small (1995), Bates et al. (2001), Fosgerau and Karlstrom
(2010), Fosgerau and Engelson (2011), and Engelson and Fosgerau (2011).
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are overlooked by the literature just reviewed, which takes the perspective of a
single individual.
We develop an economic model for a meeting between two people. The model
describes two players each initially engaged in some activity from which they
each derive utility at a declining rate. Each must choose a departure time from
his activity, and after a random travel time with known distribution each arrives at
the meeting. The players only derive utility at the meeting after both have arrived,
and thus waiting for the other player is costly. Players choose departure time to
maximize their payoff, the expected utility.4 We consider Nash equilibrium where
neither player has incentive to change departure time given the departure time of
the other and compare this to the set of Pareto optima.
Our findings may be summarized as follows. We find that Nash equilibrium
exists in our model and is unique. A player’s payoff depends on the joint travel
time distribution of both players. Specifically, payoffs are non-increasing in the
variance of the difference of travel times, which means that not only the variance
of the individual travel times but also their correlation matters. These conclusions
are natural but do not arise in the extant literature discussed above. Moreover,
there is a continuum of Pareto optima in the model, and these Pareto optima corre-
spond one-to-one to the probability that the first player is late. Nash equilibrium is
not Pareto optimal, and there exists a continuum of Pareto optima that yield strict
increases in payoff for both players relative to Nash equilibrium. With penalties to
each player for arriving later than the other, it is possible to implement any Pareto
optimum as a Nash equilibrium. Some Pareto optima may also be implemented
4This is a kind of coordination game. The standard coordination game has discrete strategy
set, whereas the strategy set here is continuous.
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through a scheme that compensates players for waiting for the other.
These results have implications that seem not to have been discussed before.
First, evaluation of measures to reduce travel time variability could seek to take
into account the interaction with other people than the travelers who are directly
affected, namely those who might be waiting for the travelers when they arrive
late. Second, there might be occasions where alternative policy measures have
different effects on the distribution of travel times within a city. In such cases, the
present results suggest that measures that have greater effect on the variance of dif-
ferences in travel times for different transport corridors should be given more em-
phasis, ceteris paribus. Finally, employers could conceivably implement penalty
or compensation schemes for their employees that lead to a Pareto optimum as the
Nash outcome, where the penalty or compensation depends on the difference in
arrival times.
As the variability of the difference of travel times matters in our model, it is
relevant to examine empirically the joint distribution of travel times for different
travel relations. Since it is necessary to use data at the level of trips and not
just roads, data requirements for a comprehensive empirical analysis are quite
severe and we have not been able to find relevant studies in the literature. Instead,
Appendix C provides a cursory examination using data from cameras installed
on major arterial roadways in the Stockholm urban area. We have identified nine
pairs of paths having cameras at both ends, each pair having different upstream
locations and a single downstream location in the city center. The paths are rather
short, but are the best we could find. Using data from the a.m. and p.m. peaks of
all weekdays from September and October, during 2005 to 2007, we produced the
table shown in Appendix C. The data reveal substantial travel time variability with
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a standard deviation of travel time ranging up to 75% of the mean travel time. The
correlation within pairs ranges widely from -0.4 to 0.4, indicating that it would be
clearly inadequate to assume travel times to be independent in order to compute
the variance of the travel time difference.
Our model does not comprise the concept of a designated meeting time. The
basic mechanism driving our model is the most fundamental property of in-person
meetings, namely that the meeting does not in fact occur until both participants
are present. The present model is the simplest we can conceive that comprises this
mechanism. Extending the model with a designated meeting time requires some
other elements to be included as well. In particular, there must be some penalty
(e.g. accounting for embarrassment) for being late relative to the meeting time,
and there must also be some mechanism for agreeing on a meeting time. Hence,
including a designated meeting time would be a significant complication of the
present model.
Our model is related to Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2006), who consider a man-
ager who schedules simultaneous production processes of random duration where
it is costly if the processes do not finish at the same time. Assuming indepen-
dent random activity durations and linear costs for arrival earlier or later than the
last completed activity, they characterize the socially optimal target arrival times
in terms of the probability of arriving last, and they show how a penalty for last
arrival can be determined that internalizes the total cost and results in the most
efficient target arrivals. In contrast, the present paper considers individually ra-
tional agents facing trips with dependent durations and nonlinear costs for early
departure.
Basu and Weibull (2003) discuss the habit of punctuality in the context of
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choosing departure time for meetings with random travel times. They find that
two stable Nash equilibria can arise, where either both persons are punctual or
both tardy, and they conclude that the same society may be caught in a punctual
or in a tardy equilibrium. The strategy set in their paper consists of the two strate-
gies, the punctual and the tardy, and it is that discreteness which leads to multiple
equilibria. In our paper, the strategy set is continuous, and this leads to just one
equilibrium.
Our model does not represent congestion but merely takes a consequence of
congestion, travel time variability, as given. By the same token, we have no con-
gestion externality in our model. Our model could conceivably be used to extend
models of congestion.
The paper is organized as follows. We formulate our model in Section 2,
and Nash equilibrium is analyzed in Section 3, with some results on the cost of
travel time variability in Section 3.1. Section 4 analyzes Pareto optimum with
results on the implementation of Pareto optimum through penalty or compensation
schemes in Section 4.1 and a numerical example is given in Section 4.2. Section
5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix, which also provides a summary of the
notation employed as well as of travel time data from Stockholm.
2 A meeting game
Consider two players, labeled 1 and 2, who are going to a joint meeting. They each
have a utility function describing their preferences regarding the timing of their
meeting. If the players depart at times d1 and d2 from their previous activities
and experience travel times of T1 and T2, then their meeting can start at time
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max {d1 + T1, d2 + T2}. Their utility functions are defined as functions of their
own departure time and the time at which the meeting starts by
Ui [d1, d2] =
∫ di
0
hi [s] ds− wi max {d1 + T1, d2 + T2} . (1)
When di, T1 and T2 are fixed, this is an instance of trip timing preferences in-
troduced by Vickrey (1973). The players derive utility at the individual-specific
time varying rate hi until the time of departure; then they derive zero utility while
traveling and while possibly waiting for the other player to arrive at the meeting;
then they derive utility at the individual-specific constant rate wi > 0 until the
meeting ends. Note that in general, hi is not required to be greater than zero; such
an assumption would reflect that staying longer at the origin is always preferred
to traveling, ceteris paribus. Some results later, however, will require positivity of
hi. The points in time when the previous activity begins and when the meeting
ends are constant; they are set to zero to economize on notation, and at no loss of
generality. This leads to the form in (1).
Throughout the paper, we impose the following condition on the utility rates
hi.
Condition 1 The utility rates hi are differentiable with h′i < 0 andwi ∈ range [hi] , i =
1, 2.
It is possible to establish unique existence of Nash equilibrium with increasing
marginal utility rates of time spent at the meeting. However, other conclusions that
we obtain in the paper rely on the tractability that we get from the constant utility
rate at the meeting.
Travel times Ti > 0 are random variables possessing means E [Ti] = µi, they
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are independent of the departure times but may be mutually dependent. Players
choose a departure time to maximize expected utility, taking the departure time of
the other player as given, with payoffs
ui [d1, d2] = EUi [d1, d2] =
∫ di
0
hi [s] ds− wiEmax {d1 + T1, d2 + T2} . (2)
Denoting the difference of random travel times ∆ = T2− T1, the payoff of player
i can be written5 as
ui [d1, d2] =
∫ di
0
hi [s] ds−wid1 + d2
2
−wiE
[
T1 + T2
2
]
−wiE
[ |d1 − d2 −∆|
2
]
.
(3)
Hence, the mean average travel time and the distribution of the travel time differ-
ence ∆ are the only relevant attributes of travel time for the payoffs. To guarantee
existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium (as will be shown) we assume the
following condition throughout the paper, which rules out mass points in the dis-
tribution of ∆.6
Condition 2 ∆ has compact support with continuous cumulative distribution func-
tion F .
If there is zero probability that players arrive simultaneously, d1+T1 = d2+T2,
5Using that max {x, y} = x+y2 + |x−y|2 .
6If ∆ has a discrete distribution, then hi can be found such that there is a continuum of Nash
equilibria.
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then the derivatives7 of the payoffs are
∂u1
∂d1
= h1 [d1]− w1F [d1 − d2] , (4a)
∂u2
∂d2
= h2 [d2]− w2 (1− F [d1 − d2]) , (4b)
and by Condition 1 they attain values both larger and smaller than zero. Other-
wise, the derivatives do not exist at points (d1, d2) with non-zero probability of
simultaneous arrival. Moreover, ∂ui
∂di
is decreasing in di. Therefore the best re-
sponse of each player exists and is unique. The best response of player i always
satisfies
0 6 hi [di] 6 wi, (5)
since otherwise the player can increase her payoff by unilaterally advancing or
postponing her departure.
3 Nash equilibrium
We begin by analyzing Nash equilibrium. The derivatives (4) attain the value 0,
and the response functions di = ri [dj] satisfy the first-order conditions h1 [r1 [d2]] = w1F [r1 [d2]− d2] ,h2 [r2 [d1]] = w2 (1− F [d1 − r2 [d1]]) . (6)
We will establish necessary and sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness
of a Nash equilibrium. Equilibrium requires that r1 [r2 [d1]] = d1, i.e. that if
player 1 plays d1, and player 2 responds with r2 [d1] , then player 1 will not want
7Starting from (2), use that the derivative of max {d1 + T1, d2 + T2} is 1 when d1 + T1 >
d2 + T2, which happens with probability F (d1 − d2). It is zero otherwise.
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to change. We are thus looking for points d1 where the response to the response
r1 [r2 [·]] meets the 45 degree line. If function F is differentiable everywhere, then
the uniqueness can be proved by differentiating the first-order conditions, solving
with respect to r′2 [d1] and noting that the response to the response, r1 [r2 [·]], has
derivative less than 1, hence at most one equilibrium can exist. The theorem here
is slightly more general.
Theorem 1 There is at most one Nash equilibrium.
The existence of Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed because the response
curves may not cross. Indeed, it follows by letting di = ri [dj] and adding
the conditions in (6) that Nash equilibrium satisfies the equation h1 [d1] /w1 +
h2 [d2] /w2 = 1, the possibility of which requires the following condition to hold.
Condition 3 limx→+∞
[
h1[x]
w1
+ h2[x]
w2
]
< 1.
This condition is also sufficient for the existence of Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2 Condition 3 is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Nash
equilibrium.
Intuitively, failure of Condition 3 implies that the players are not able to find a
solution that is optimal for both, because optimality of departure time for each of
them requires the ratio of utility rates hi [di] /wi to equal the probability of arriving
later than the other player, and yet these ratios never sum to 1; there would always
be one of the players who would have incentive to depart later. Condition 3 will
be maintained throughout the paper.
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3.1 The cost of travel time variability
In this section we consider the connection between the players’ payoff and the
distribution of random travel times. As noted before, what matters about the travel
time distribution is the average expected travel time, and the distribution of the
difference of travel times. We parameterize the difference of travel times as ∆ =
T2 − T1 = µ+ σY .
Theorem 3 The players’ payoffs in the Nash equilibrium ui [d∗1, d∗2] are non-increasing
functions of the scale σ of the difference of travel times. In particular, they are de-
creasing if both functions hi are positive.
Thus, given fixed mean travel times, increasing the variability of difference of
travel times reduces the payoffs of both players.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the extant literature on valuing travel time
variability takes the perspective of a single player. A result like Theorem 3 could
not be formulated within this literature. This paper describes a situation where a
change in travel time variability for one player affects also the other player. As
shown in Theorem 3, the effect occurs fully through the variance of the travel
time difference. The change in the variance of the travel time difference that
follows a change in travel time variance for one player depends crucially on the
correlation between the travel times. Depending on this correlation, an increase in
travel time variability for one player may either increase or decrease the variance
of the travel time difference. Reparameterize the travel time distributions as Ti =
µi + σiXi, where now Xi are standardized with mean zero and variance one, ρ1,2
is the correlation coefficient for X1, X2 and note that ∂σ∂σi = 2σi − 2σjρ1,2. Then
the following corollary is immediate.
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Corollary 1 Assume Condition 3 and that functions hi are positive. Then the
change in payoff for player 1 from a marginal change in travel time variability for
player i is
du1 [d
∗
1, d
∗
2]
dσi
=
du1 [d
∗
1, d
∗
2]
dσ
2 (σi − σjρ1,2) ,
and it is negative if and only if ρ1,2 < σi/σj .
If travel times are negatively correlated, then an increase in travel time vari-
ability for either player is always costly for both players. Further, since ρ1,2 is
never greater than 1, then if player i already has the highest travel time variability
then increasing his travel time variability will always make both players worse off.
However, if the correlation is sufficiently large and player i has the smallest travel
time variability, then an increase in his travel time variability, ceteris paribus, is
beneficial for both players. This effect arises because the increase will make their
random delays and their resulting departure decisions better synchronized. Ap-
pendix C provides some empirical evidence on the correlation of travel times in
Stockholm. In none of the cases we examine there is an increase in travel time
variability beneficial.
4 Pareto optimum
We now turn to consider Pareto optima, defined as pairs of departure times where
it is not possible to increase payoff for one player without reducing it for the other.
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The payoff functions (2) for the players have gradients
∇u1 [d1, d2] =
 h1 [d1]− w1F [d1 − d2]
−w1 (1− F [d1 − d2])
 , (7a)
∇u2 [d1, d2] =
 −w2F [d1 − d2]
h2 [d2]− w2 (1− F [d1 − d2])
 . (7b)
According to Ehrgott (2005, Thms 3.21 and 3.27), the first-order conditions for
Pareto optimum can be expressed via the vector equation
λ1∇u1 [d1, d2] + λ2∇u2 [d1, d2] = 0. (8)
Existence of positive (λ1, λ2) satisfying (8) is a sufficient condition for (d1, d2) to
be a Pareto optimum while existence of non-negative (λ1, λ2) satisfying (8), with
at least one of them positive, is a necessary condition for Pareto optimality. Using
the gradient expressions (7) above, the sufficient condition can be expressed8 as(
h1
w1
− F
)(
h2
w2
− (1− F )
)
= (1− F )F (9a){
h1
w1
= F = 0
}
∨
{(
h1
w1
− F
)
F > 0
}
(9b){
h2
w2
= (1− F ) = 0
}
∨
{(
h2
w2
− (1− F )
)
(1− F ) > 0
}
, (9c)
while the necessary condition is(
h1
w1
− F
)(
h2
w2
− (1− F )
)
= (1− F )F (10a)(
h1
w1
− F
)
F ≥ 0 (10b)(
h2
w2
− (1− F )
)
(1− F ) ≥ 0. (10c)
8Omitting function arguments for visual clarity. The symbol ∨ denotes logical ”or”.
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It turns out there is a continuum of Pareto optima in this game. In fact, for
each possible realization of the travel time difference there is a Pareto optimum
that has the same difference between the departure times of the players. Hence,
all possible divisions of the risk of having to wait for the other player are attained
as Pareto optima.
Theorem 4 Assume h1 and h2 are positive. Assume F is continuous and increas-
ing on supp ∆. Then there is a continuum of Pareto optima, each uniquely cor-
responding to different d1 − d2 ∈ supp ∆, and no other Pareto optima. The set
of Pareto optima coincides with the set of solutions to (9a) such that d1 − d2 ∈
supp ∆.
It is natural to ask whether the Nash equilibrium can be a Pareto optimum.
When utility rates hi are positive, i.e. when time at the origin is preferred to
traveling, then this turns out never to be the case. Some intervention is required to
reach a Pareto optimum.
Theorem 5 With positive h1 and h2, Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.
The reason behind Theorem 5 is that both players in Nash equilibrium could
gain if they both departed a little earlier. This insight is generalized in the next
theorem, which states that Pareto optimum requires at least one of the players to
depart so early that the utility rate at the origin is at least as high as at the meeting.
Otherwise both players would gain if both departed a little earlier.
Theorem 6 With h1 [d1] < w1 and h2 [d2] < w2, then (d1, d2) can not be a Pareto
optimum.
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The next theorem affirms that there always exists Pareto optima that are im-
provements relative to Nash equilibrium for both players. It is hard to give an
intuition for this theorem, it relies on properties of concave optimization over
compact sets.
Theorem 7 Let the travel time difference admit a density. Then there is a contin-
uum of Pareto optima that are improvements relative to Nash equilibrium for both
players.
Section 4.2 below presents an example where all Pareto optima are improve-
ments relative to Nash equilibrium for both players. That section also shows an
example, where there exists a Pareto optimum that is worse than Nash equilibrium
for one of the players.
4.1 Implementing Pareto optimum
There are two simple ways to implement a Pareto optimum as a Nash equilibrium
through a pricing mechanism: a penalty or a compensation. We take into account
the effect of payment on behavior but disregard that payment or compensation
affects welfare and assume this effect is neutralized in some way. We consider
first a penalty and discuss a compensation scheme later. Denote the random ar-
rival time of player i at the meeting as Ai = Ti + di. If each player i pays a
positive penalty for being late of βiwi max {Ai − Aj, 0}, then the first-order con-
ditions for Nash equilibrium become h1 [d1]−w1F [d1 − d2] = β1F [d1 − d2] and
h2 [d2]−w2 (1− F [d1 − d2]) = β2 (1− F [d1 − d2]), which satisfy the necessary
conditions for Pareto optimum in (10) if and only if β1β2 = 1. We show that Nash
equilibrium exists uniquely in the game with these penalties, and that this Nash
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equilibrium is Pareto optimum in the original game without penalties. Increasing
β1 benefits the first player and hurts the other.
Theorem 8 Consider the game with penalties βiwi max {Ai − Aj, 0} , βi > 0, i, j =
1, 2. If β1β2 = 1, then the Nash equilibrium of this game exists uniquely and it is
a Pareto optimum for the original game without penalties. In this equilibrium, the
second player’s payoff u2 of the original game is non-decreasing in β1 while the
payoff u1, the departure time difference d1 − d2 and the probability F [d1 − d2]
for player 1 of arriving later than player 2 are non-increasing in β1. If β1β2 6= 1
then Nash equilibrium cannot be a Pareto optimum in the original game without
penalties.
If alternatively each player 1 receives a positive compensation α1w1 max {A2 − A1.0}
when player 2 is late, and player 2 similarly receives a positive compensation
α2w2 max {A1 − A2, 0} when player 1 is late, then the first-order conditions for
Nash equilibrium become
h1 [d1]− w1 (α1 + (1− α1)F [d1 − d2]) = 0, (11a)
h2 [d2]− w2 (α2 + (1− α2) (1− F [d1 − d2])) = 0, (11b)
which satisfy the necessary conditions for Pareto optimum in (10) if and only if
α1α2 = 1. So we may as well define α1 = α > 0 and α2 = α−1. From (11) we
see that the condition
h1 [d1] /w1 = αh2 [d2] /w2, (12)
must hold at Nash equilibrium, which implies that Nash equilibrium can only exist
if
inf h1
w1
w2
suph2
< α <
suph1
w1
w2
inf h2
. (13)
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Thus the conditions for existence of Nash equilibrium in the game with compensa-
tions are more restrictive than in the game with penalties. However, if α = 1, then
it is easy to check that there is a unique Nash equilibrium
(
h−11 [w1] , h
−1
2 [w2]
)
.
The following theorem partly parallels Theorem 8 with the difference that we
can only be sure the Nash equilibrium exists for α near 1.
Theorem 9 Suppose that the density of the travel time difference is continuous.
Consider the game with compensations defined as above. There is an interval
around 1 such that Nash equilibrium of this game exists uniquely for any α in this
interval.
The following theorem strengthens the last result concerning existence of Nash
equilibrium in the game with compensations at the price of not guaranteeing
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Theorem 10 Suppose
max
{
inf h1
w1
,
w2
suph2
}
< α < min
{
suph1
w1
,
w2
inf h2
}
.
Then there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game with compensations.
In particular, if range (h1) = range (h2) = R+, then Nash equilibrium exists
for any α > 0. Moreover, note that (13) is satisfied for α in a neighborhood of
1, such that the conclusion of Theorem 9 regarding existence is incorporated in
Theorem 10.
Even when Nash equilibrium exists in the game with compensations, it does
not necessarily constitute Pareto optimum in the original game. It follows from
Theorem 4 that d1 − d2 ∈ supp ∆ in Pareto optimum. This relationship may not
be valid for all α.
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Example 1 Let hi (di) = exp (−di) and wi = 1, i = 1, 2. Then inf hi =
0, suphi = ∞ and Nash equilibrium in the game with compensations exists for
any α > 0 by Theorem 10. Equation (12) implies d1 − d2 = − lnα at Nash equi-
librium. Thus the game with compensation does not implement Pareto optimum if
− lnα /∈ suppF . In particular, the fair compensation rule with α = 1 does not
implement Pareto optimum if 0 /∈ suppF .
As for β in the case with penalties, we find that the difference between equi-
librium departure times depends monotonically on α, at least in the range of α
where the Nash equilibrium is unique. The intuition is straightforward: a larger α
decreases the cost for player 1 of arriving early and increases it for player 2.
Theorem 11 Let d∗ [α] = (d∗1 [α] , d∗2 [α]) be the unique Nash equilibrium in the
game with compensations for α near 1. Then d∗1 [α]− d∗2 [α] is decreasing.
We complete the discussion by asking whether penalties and compensations
may be defined in a single scheme that implements Pareto optimum as a Nash
equilibrium. Suppose then that penalties are introduced with weights β1 and β2
and also that compensations are introduced with weights α1 and α2. Suppose
also that we are looking for Pareto optima with 0 < F (d1 − d2) < 1. Then
the first necessary condition for Pareto optimum (10) implies that either α1 =
α−12 > 0 with β1 = β2 = 0, or conversely that β1 = β
−1
2 > 0 with α1 = α2 =
0, meaning that penalties and compensations cannot be combined to implement
Pareto optimum.
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Figure 1: Numerical illustration as discussed in the text
4.2 Numerical illustration
This section provides a numerical example to illustrate the concepts involved. The
example is shown in Figure 1. Let hi [x] = 4/ (x+ 4) for x ≥ −2, and hi [x] =
−x for x < −2, i = 1, 2. Let w1 = w2 = 1. Further assume that the travel
time difference is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and note that this assumption
introduces asymmetry between players . To find the unique Nash equilibrium,
solve the system of equations
4
d1 + 4
− d1 + d2 = 0
4
d2 + 4
− 1 + d1 − d2 = 0,
which reduces to a third degree equation. The solution is found numerically to be
(4.25, 3.76), shown as point E in the figure.
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The set of Pareto optima (using S = d1 − d2) is{
(d1, d2) |
(
4
d1 + 4
− S
)(
4
d2 + 4
− 1 + S
)
= S (1− S) , 0 ≤ S ≤ 1
}
,
which reduces to
{(
d2 +
√−d2, d2
) | − 1 ≤ d2 ≤ 0} and is indicated in the figure
by the thick solid curve from B to C. Note that the payoffs u1 and u2 attain their
global maxima at the endpoints (0, 0) and (0,−1) of the Pareto set, corresponding
to B and C.
In the game with penalties, the Nash equilibrium runs along the Pareto set ap-
proaching point C (0,−1) as α→ 0 and the point B (0, 0) as α→∞. According
to Theorem 8, all Nash equilibria of the game with penalties are Pareto optima of
the original game. Moreover, all but two Pareto allocations can be implemented
in this way.
In the game with compensations, the Nash equilibrium runs up along the ver-
tical axis from D to C as α runs from 0 to 3/4, then follows the Pareto set from
C to B for 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1, and finally continues left along the horizontal axis from
B to A for α > 1, as demonstrated by the thin solid line in the figure 1. Hence
in this example, all Pareto optima can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the
game with compensations, but not all these Nash equilibria are Pareto optima.
Finally, we will find the level sets for the payoffs of the Nash equilibrium of
the original game. The payoffs are ui [d1, d2] = 4 ln [di + 4]−Φ [d1, d2]+C where
Φ [d1, d2] =

d2, d1 − d2 ≤ 0
(d1 − d2)2 /2 + d2, 0 < d1 − d2 ≤ 1
d1 − 1/2, 1 < d1 − d2
and the constant C depends on the mean travel times. The value of C is irrelevant
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and we just use C = 0. The Nash equilibrium payoffs are then u1 (4.25, 3.76) =
4.56 and u2 (4.25, 3.76) = 4.32. Within the band 0 < d1 − d2 ≤ 1, the equations
for the level sets of u1 and u2 are d2 = d1 − 1 +
√
8 ln [d1 + 4]− 2d1 − 8.12
and d1 = d2 +
√
8 ln [d1 + 4]− 2d2 − 8.64, respectively. Above this band, the
corresponding equations are d2 = 4 ln [d1 + 4]−4.56 and d2 = 4.00, while below
the band they are d1 = 4.50 and d1 = 4 ln [d2 + 4] − 3.82. The level sets are
shown in Figure 1 as dashed for u1 and dotted for u2. For both level sets the
whole Pareto set lies on the same side of the level set as the corresponding global
optimum. Thus all Pareto optima are improvements relative to Nash equilibrium
for both players in this example (cf. Theorem 7).
If the travel time difference is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [9, 10]
(instead of [0, 1]) then the Nash equilibrium is (10.758, 1.487) with payoffs u1 =
44.20 and u2 = 40.24. Furthermore, one Pareto optimum (which is a global
optimum for player 1) is located at (0,−10) where the payoffs are u1 = 50 and
u2 = −0.77. Thus in this case there is a Pareto optimum which is an improvement
for player 1 but not for player 2, compared to the Nash equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
This paper has formulated and analyzed a game theoretic model to describe the
essential features of a physical meeting between two persons facing random travel
time variability. Even though the issue is clearly important, it has so far been
ignored by the literature, which has exclusively taken the perspective of individual
travelers. As discussed in the Introduction, the present analysis opens the door for
new considerations on policies to address urban congestion.
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Future work could extend the analysis in several directions. One extension
would be to include the concept of a designated meeting time; this would require
some specification of a process to determine the meeting time as well as incor-
poration of penalties (accounting, e.g., for embarrassment) for being late relative
to the meeting time. Another extension to the model would allow for meetings
between more than two players; we have not been able to carry out such an ex-
tension but others might be more successful. Moreover, the model could perhaps
be extended to take into account that waiting at the meeting place might be more
productive than traveling even if less productive than meeting.
There is also much empirical work that could be done. As large-scale datasets
of GPS traces of moving cars become available, we are approaching the point
where the pattern of travel time variability across cities becomes observable and
amenable to modeling. Then network models could be developed to predict changes
in the pattern of travel time variability resulting from various policies. Travel sur-
veys could be extended to include information about meetings of various kinds,
and this information could be used in the empirical application of the meeting
model.
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A Notation
Notation Explanation
Ai Random arrival time for individual i
di Departure time for individual i
d∗i Nash equilibrium departure time for individual i
F, f CDF and PDF for ∆
i, j Individuals from the set (1, 2)
hi Marginal utility of individual i spending time at the origin
ri Response function for individual i
S Difference in departure times, d1 − d2
Ti Random travel time for individual i
Ui Utility for individual i
ui Expected utility for individual i
wi Marginal utility for individual i spending time at the meeting
Xi Standardized travel time for i
Y Standardized difference in travel times
αi Individual i’s earliness compensation
βi Individual i’s lateness penalty
∆ Random variable for the difference in travel times, T2 − T1
µ Mean of the difference in travel times, ∆
λi Parameter in the first-order condition for Pareto optimum
µi Mean travel time for individual i
ρij Correlation coefficient of travel times for individuals i and j
σ Standard deviation of the difference in travel times, ∆
σi Standard deviation of travel time for individual i
Φ A part of the function for payoffs under Nash equilibrium
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B Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. We claim that r1 [d2] 6 r1 [d2 + η] < r1 [d2] + η for any
d2 and η > 0. Indeed, denote d1 = r1 [d2], d′1 = r1 [d2 + η] and assume d
′
1 >
d1 + η. Use (6), the monotonicity of F and the strict monotonicity of h1 to obtain
that h1 [d′1] = w1F [d
′
1 − d2 − η] > w1F [d1 − d2] = h1 [d1] > h1 [d′1], which
is a contradiction. Now assume d′1 < d1. Then h1 [d
′
1] = w1F [d
′
1 − d2 − η] 6
w1F [d1 − d2] = h1 [d1] < h1 [d′1], which is again a contradiction. Thus the claim
is established.
It follows from the claim that r1 is a weak contraction mapping, i.e. |r1 [d′2]− r1 [d2]| <
|d′2 − d2| for any d2, d′2. In a similar way one can show that r2 is a weak contrac-
tion as well. Therefore the composition r1 [r2 [·]] is a weak contraction too and
cannot have more than one fixed point.
Proof of Theorem 2. The necessary part has already been proved. To show the
sufficiency, denote d2 = r2 [d1]. We claim that r1 [r2 [d1]] < d1 for d1 sufficiently
large.
First, if h1 [d01] = 0 for some d
0
1, then (4a) implies that r1 [d2] 6 d01 for any d2.
Therefore for any d1 > d01 we have r1 [r2 [d1]] < d
0
1 < d1.
If h2 [d02] = 0 for some d
0
2, then choose d1 > r1 [d
0
2] and d1 > d
0
2 + b where
F [b] = 1. Due to (4a), d2 6 d02 and therefore h2 [d2] = w2 (1− F [d1 − d2]) 6
w2 (1− F [d1 − d02]) = 0. Hence d2 = d02 and again r1 [r2 [d1]] < d01 < d1.
It remains to prove the claim when h1 and h2 are always positive. Denote
qi = limx→+∞ hi [x] /wi and choose positive ε < 1−q1−q22 . There exists M such
that hi [x] /wi < qi + ε for all x > M , i = 1, 2. Choose d1 > M + |a|+ |b| where
F [a] = 0. Then from the first-order condition for the best response of player 2
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we obtain F [d1 − d2] = 1 − h2 [d2] /w2 < 1 whence d2 > d1 − b > d1 − |b| >
M + |a| >M . By the choice of M this implies
1− F [d1 − d2] = h2 [d2] /w2 < q2 + ε
Denote d′1 = r1 [d2] . From the first-order condition for the best response of
player 1 we obtain F [d′1 − d2] = h1 [d′1] /w1 > 0 which implies d′1 > d2 + a >
M + |a|+ a >M, whence F [d′1 − d2] = h1 [d′1] /w1 < q1 + ε.
Adding the two inequalities yields
F [d′1 − d2] + 1− F [d1 − d2] < q1 + q2 + 2ε < 1
or
F [d′1 − d2] < F [d1 − d2] ,
which is only possible if d′1 < d1 i.e. r1 [r2 [d1]] − d1 < 0. Thus we have estab-
lished the claim made above.
By (6) we have r1 [x] > h−11 [w1] for any x. Therefore for any d1 < h−11 [w1]
we have r1 [r2 [d1]] − d1 > 0. Thus r1 [r2 [d1]] − d1 is positive for d1 < h−11 [w1]
and negative for d1 large enough. Then continuity of r1 [r2 [d1]]− d1 (implied by
the weak contraction property shown in the proof of Theorem 1) yields existence
of a departure time d1 such that r1 [r2 [d1]] − d1 = 0, i.e. (d1, r2 [d1]) is a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3. We need only prove the theorem for player 1. Using the
envelope theorem we find that
du1 [d
∗
1, d
∗
2]
dσ
=
∂u1
∂d2
dd∗2
dσ
+
∂u1
∂σ
.
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From (2) and (3) and denoting q = d
∗
1−d∗2−µ
σ
, the derivatives of the payoff function
are obtained as
∂u1
∂d2
= −w1P [∆ > d∗1 − d∗2] = −w1
+∞∫
q
ϕ [x] dx
and
∂u1
∂σ
= −w1
2
E
[
∂
∂σ
|µ+ σX − d∗1 + d∗2|
]
= −w1
2
+∞∫
q
xϕ [x] dx+
w1
2
q∫
−∞
xϕ [x] dx
= −w1
+∞∫
q
xϕ [x] dx.
To compute the derivative dd
∗
2
dσ
, differentiate the first-order conditions h1 [d
∗
1] /w1 + h2 [d
∗
2] /w2 = 1
h1 [d
∗
1] = w1Φ [q]
(14)
to obtain 
h′1[d∗1]
w1
dd∗1
dσ
+
h′2[d∗2]
w2
dd∗2
dσ
= 0
h′1[d∗1]
w1
dd∗1
dσ
= ϕ [q]
(
dd∗1
dσ
− dd
∗
2
dσ
)
−q
σ
and solve to obtain
dd∗2
dσ
= − ϕ [q]
h′1[d∗1]
w1
ϕ [q]
(
h′1[d∗1]
w1
+
h′2[d∗2]
w2
)
− h
′
1[d∗1]
w1
h′2[d∗2]
w2
σ
q = −λq,
where 0 6 λ < 1 since h′i [d∗i ] < 0. Therefore
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du1 [d
∗
1, d
∗
2]
dσ
= w1
+∞∫
q
ϕ [x] dx · λq − w1
+∞∫
q
xϕ [x] dx
= w1
+∞∫
q
(λq − x)ϕ [x] dx
6 w1
+∞∫
q
(λ− 1)xϕ [x] dx 6 0,
where the last inequality is due to EX = 0. It follows from the non-positivity of
the derivative that the payoff of the first player in the equilibrium is non-increasing
in σ.
To prove the second assertion of the theorem note that the last inequality can
be satisfied as an equality only when Φ [q] = 0 or Φ [q] = 1. Due to the first-order
conditions (14), this is only possible if h1 [d∗1] = 0 or h2 [d
∗
2] = 0. Thus when both
functions hi are positive we have
du1[d∗1,d∗2]
dσ
< 0, which proves that the payoff of
the first player in the equilibrium is decreasing as a function of σ.
Proof of Theorem 4. First we will show that for each 0 < φ < 1, there is a
Pareto optimum (d∗1, d
∗
2) such that F [d
∗
1 − d∗2] = φ. There is a unique δ such that
F [δ] = φ. Consider a function defined by
M [d1] =
(
h1 [d1]
w1
− φ
)(
h2 [d1 − δ]
w2
− 1 + φ
)
− φ (1− φ)
=
h1 [d1]
w1
h2 [d1 − δ]
w2
−
(
φ
h2 [d1 − δ]
w2
+ (1− φ) h1 [d1]
w1
)
.
Let a = min
{
h−11 [w1] , h
−1
2 [w2] + δ
}
and b = max
{
h−11 [w1] , h
−1
2 [w2] + δ
}
.
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Then h1 [a] ≥ w1 and h2 [a− δ] ≥ w2. Hence,
M [a] =
h1 [a]
w1
h2 [a− δ]
w2
−
(
φ
h2 [a− δ]
w2
+ (1− φ) h1 [a]
w1
)
≥ h1 [a]
w1
h2 [a− δ]
w2
−max
{
h1 [a]
w1
,
h2 [a− δ]
w2
}
≥ 0.
Similarly, M [b] ≤ 0. Since M is continuous it follows that there is d∗1 such that
M [d∗1] = 0, i.e. (d
∗
1, d
∗
2) satisfy the first condition in (9). Now, either h1 [b] = w1
or h2 [b− δ] = w2. In the first case h1[d
∗
1]
w1
− φ ≥ h1[b]
w1
− φ = 1 − φ > 0,
which implies
h2[d∗2]
w2
− (1− φ) > 0, since
(
h1[d∗1]
w1
− φ
)(
h2[d∗1−δ]
w2
− (1− φ)
)
=
φ (1− φ) > 0, so the second and the third conditions in (9). The second case is
considered similarly and leads to the same conclusion. Thus (d∗1, d
∗
2) is a Pareto
optimum for any 0 < φ < 1. Moreover, for each pair (d∗1, d
∗
2) there is a unique
φ = F [d∗1 − d∗2]. Hence there is a continuum of Pareto optima.
Next we show that d1 − d2 /∈ supp ∆ cannot be a Pareto optimum. If, in
particular, F [d1 − d2 + ε] = 0, ε > 0, then replacement of d1 by d1 + ε increases
the payoff of the first player without effect on the payoff of the second player,
hence this is not a Pareto optimum. The case F [d1 − d2 − ε] = 1, ε > 0 is
similar.
Finally, we show that d∗1 − d∗2 on the boundary of supp ∆ corresponds to a
unique Pareto optimum. Assume F [d∗1 − d∗2] = 0 and F [δ] > 0 for δ > d∗1 − d∗2.
Then the necessary conditions (10) give the unique d∗2 such that h2 [d
∗
2] = w2. The
payoff of player 2 cannot be increased since he is guaranteed to arrive later than
player 1 and his utility rate at the origin is the same as at the meeting. The only
change he is indifferent to is unilateral earlier departure of player 1. However this
change decreases payoff for player 1. Hence (d∗1, d
∗
2) is a PO. Formally, assume
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d2 6= d∗2 and estimate
u2 [d1, d2]− u2 [d∗1, d∗2] = (u2 [d1, d2]− u2 [d1 + d∗2 − d2, d∗2]) (15)
+ (u2 [(d1 + d
∗
2 − d2, d∗2)]− u2 [d∗1, d∗2])
Based on (2), the first parenthesis in (15) can be bounded as follows:∫ d2
d∗2
h2 [s] ds− w2Emax {d1 + T1, d2 + T2}+ w2Emax {d1 + d∗2 − d2 + T1, d∗2 + T2}
=
∫ d2
d∗2
h2 [s] ds+ w2 (d
∗
2 − d2) =
∫ d2
d∗2
(h2 [s]− w2) ds < 0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that h2 [s] > w2 for s < d∗2 and
h2 [s] < w2 for s > d∗2. By the mean value theorem, there exists s strictly between
d∗1 and d1 + d
∗
2 − d2 such that the second parenthesis in (15) can be written as
(d1 + d
∗
2 − d2 − d∗1)
∂u2
∂d1
[s, d∗2] = − (d1 + d∗2 − d2 − d∗1)w2F [s− d∗2] .
This is negative if (d1 + d∗2 − d2 − d∗1) > 0 and 0 otherwise, because F [s− d∗2] >
0 for s > d∗1 and F [s− d∗2] = 0 for s ≤ d∗1. Thus the whole expression (15) is
negative.
It remains to consider the case d2 = d∗2. If d1 > d
∗
1 then, similarly, we have
u2 [d1, d
∗
2]− u2 [d∗1, d∗2] = (d1 − d∗1)
∂u2
∂d1
[s− d∗2] = − (d1 − d∗1)w2F [s− d∗2] < 0
while d1 < d∗1 yields u2 [d1, d
∗
2]− u2 [d∗1, d∗2] < 0 since
∂u1
∂d1
[s− d∗2] = h1 [s]− w1F [s− d∗2] = h1 [s] > 0
for s < d∗1.
Proof of Theorem 5. Suppose (d1, d2) is both Nash equilibrium and Pareto
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optimal. The first-order Nash equilibrium necessary condition is
h1 [d1]− w1F [d1 − d2] = h2 [d2]− w2 (1− F [d1 − d2]) = 0.
Then it follows from (10) that either F [d1 − d2] = 0 or F [d1 − d2] = 1, which
leads to either h1 [d1] = 0 or h2 [d2] = 0, contradicting the assumption of the
theorem.
Proof of theorem 6. Let 0 < ε < min
{
d1 − h−11 [w1] , d2 − h−12 [w2]
}
. Shift of
both d1 and d2 back by ε will increase both payoffs since
ui [d1 − ε, d2 − ε]− ui [d1, d2]
=
∫ di−ε
di
hi [s] ds− wiEmax {d1 − ε+ T1, d2 − ε+ T2}
+wiEmax {d1 − ε+ T1, d2 − ε+ T2}
=
∫ di−ε
di
hi [s] ds+ wiε
=
∫ di
di−ε
(wi − hi [s]) ds > 0.
This shows that (d1, d2) is not Pareto optimal.
Proof of Theorem 7. For ui the hessian is h′i [di]− wif [d1 − d2] wif [d1 − d2]
wif [d1 − d2] −wif [d1 − d2]
 ,
which is negative definite when f [d1 − d2] > 0 and negative semi-definite other-
wise. Then payoff functions ui are concave functions of (d1, d2) where f [d1 − d2] >
0 and weakly concave elsewhere.
Denote by Li [v] = {(d1, d2) |ui [d1, d2] ≥ v}. By concavity of ui, the level
sets are convex.
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If di →∞ or di → −∞, then ui → −∞; this is easy to show using that F has
compact support. Then any intersection of level sets I (v1, v2) ≡ L1 (v1)∩L2 (v2)
is bounded. It is also closed and so it is compact.
It is immediate from the definition of Pareto optimality that a point (d1, d2) is a
Pareto optimum iff there exists (v1, v2) such that the level sets L1 (v1) and L2 (v2)
are tangent at (d1, d2).
Let (d∗1, d
∗
2) be the Nash equilibrium. By Theorems 1 and 2 it exists uniquely.
Let v∗i = ui (d
∗
1, d
∗
2) be the equilibrium payoffs. Let
vˆi = max {ui (d1, d2) | (d1, d2) ∈ I (v∗1, v∗2)} .
It follows immediately that v∗i ≤ vˆi. In fact we have v∗i < vˆi, since otherwise the
Nash equilibrium would also be a Pareto optimum, in contradiction of Theorem
5.
For any v1 ∈ [v∗1 ≤ v1 < vˆ1[, the level set intersection I (v1, v∗2) is nonempty
and the correspondence v1 → I (v1, v∗2) is continuous. Let
v˜2 (v1) = max {u2 (d1, d2) | (d1, d2) ∈ I (v1, v∗2)} .
The argmax correspondence is single-valued by Lemma 1 below. The maximum
is then attained at a single point d˜ (v1) =
(
d˜1 (v1) , d˜2 (v1)
)
, which must be a
Pareto optimum, since the level sets must be tangent at this point. By the Berge
maximum theorem, the points d˜ (v1) , v1 ∈ [v∗1 ≤ v1 < vˆ1[ , trace out a continuous
curve. The curve is not a single point, since then the maxima vˆ1, vˆ2 would be
attained at the same point, and such a point would be both Nash equilibrium and
Pareto optimum.
For any v1 > v∗1 , we have d˜ (v1) ∈ L1 (v1) and hence u1
(
d˜ (v1)
)
≥ v1 > v∗1 .
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For v1 close to v∗1 we have u2
(
d˜ (v1)
)
is close to vˆ2, and vˆ2 > v∗2 . Hence there
is a continuum of Pareto optima where both players gain strictly relative to Nash
equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The argmax correspondence in the proof of Theorem 7 is single-valued.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume on the contrary that (d11, d12) 6= (d21, d22) and
u2 (d
1
1, d
1
2) = u2 (d
2
1, d
2
2) = v˜2 (v1). Let d (λ) = (d1 (λ) , d2 (λ)) = (d
1
1, d
1
2) +
λ ((d21, d
2
2)− (d11, d12)) . By weak concavity of u2, u2 (d (λ)) = v˜2 (v1). Differenti-
ating twice with respect to λ leads to
0 = h2 [d2 (λ)]
(
d22 − d12
)− F [d1 (λ)− d2 (λ)] (d21 − d11)− (1− F [d1 (λ)− d2 (λ)]) (d22 − d12)
0 = h′2 [d2 (λ)]
(
d22 − d12
)2 − f [d1 (λ)− d2 (λ)] (d21 − d11) ((d21 − d11)− (d22 − d12))2 ,
which is a contradiction.
Proof of theorem 8. Denote α = β1 and let β2 = α−1. Payoffs in the game with
penalties are
u˘1 [d1, d2] =
∫ d1
0
h1 [s] ds− w1Emax {d1 + T1, d2 + T2} − αw1Emax {A1 − A2, 0}
=
∫ d1
0
h1 [s] ds− (1 + α)w1Emax {d1 + T1, d2 + T2}+ αw1 (d2 + ET2)
and
u˘2 [d1, d2] =
∫ d2
0
h2 [s] ds−
(
1 + α−1
)
w2Emax {d1 + T1, d2 + T2}+α−1w2 (d1 + ET1) .
Therefore the first-order conditions for the Nash equilibrium (NE) are h1 [d1]− (1 + α)w1F [d1 − d2] = 0h2 [d2]− (1 + α−1)w2 (1− F [d1 − d2]) = 0 . (16)
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Since both left hand sides in (16) are decreasing, (16) is also a sufficient
condition for Nash equilibrium. Define
G [S] = S − h−11 [(1 + α)w1F [S]] + h−12
[(
1 + α−1
)
w2 (1− F [S])
]
, (17)
noting that the inverses exist. Then note that (16) implies G [S] = 0. We have
to show existence and uniqueness of solution this equation. First note that G
has non-empty domain. Indeed, since F is continuous there exists S0 such that
F [S0] = (1 + α)
−1 and this givesG [S0] = S0−h−11 [w1]+h−12 [w2] which is well-
defined because h1 and h2 range across R+. Second, the domain of G is an open
interval since the ranges of h1 and h2 are open intervals. Third, all three terms in
(17) are non-decreasing. When S approaches the left end of the domain, there are
two cases: either h−11 [(1 + α)w1F [S]]→∞ and h−12 [(1 + α−1)w2 (1− F [S])]
does not increase, or h−12 [(1 + α
−1)w2 (1− F [S])]→ −∞ and h−11 [(1 + α)w1F [S]]
does not decrease. In both cases we have G [S] → −∞. Similarly, G [S] → ∞
when S approaches the right end of the domain. Since G is continuous and in-
creasing it follows that equation (17) has a unique solution.
It is easy to check that any solution to (16) satisfies the first equation in (9).
Since h1 and h2 are always positive, 0 < F [d1 − d2] < 1, thus the remaining
equations in (9) are satisfied as well and we have a Pareto optimum.
By (7), for any 0 < λ < 1, the first-order conditions for maximization of
v [d1, d2] = λu1 [d1, d2] + (1− λ)u2 [d1, d2] are
λ [h1 [d1]− w1F [d1 − d2]]− (1− λ)w2F [d1 − d2] = 0
−λ [w1 (1− F [d1 − d2])] + (1− λ) [h2 [d2]− w2F [d1 − d2] + 1] = 0,
which is the same as (16) with λ = (1 + α)−1. By Lemma 2, the payoff u2 is
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non-decreasing and the payoff u1 is non-increasing as functions of parameter α.
It follows from the above that S = d1 − d2 is non-increasing in α since function
G defined by (17) is non-increasing in α.
The paragraph preceding the theorem shows that Pareto optimum does not
result if β1β2 6= 1.
Lemma 2 Let u1 and u2 be real valued functions and d∗ [λ] be a unique solution
to maxd {λu1 [d] + (1− λ)u2 [d]} for any λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then u1 [d∗ [λ]] is non-
decreasing and u2 [d∗ [λ]] is non-increasing in λ.
Proof of lemma 2. Let λ1 < λ2. It follows from the conditions that
λ1u1 [d
∗ [λ1]] + (1− λ1)u2 [d∗ [λ1]] ≥ λ1u1 [d∗ [λ2]] + (1− λ1)u2 [d∗ [λ2]]
λ2u1 [d
∗ [λ2]] + (1− λ2)u2 [d∗ [λ2]] ≥ λ2u1 [d∗ [λ1]] + (1− λ2)u2 [d∗ [λ1]]
Adding these inequalities and rearranging the terms gives
(λ1 − λ2) (u1 [d∗ [λ1]]− u1 [d∗ [λ2]]) ≥ (λ2 − λ1) (u2 [d∗ [λ2]]− u2 [d∗ [λ1]]) ,
which implies
u1 [d
∗ [λ2]]− u1 [d∗ [λ1]] ≥ u2 [d∗ [λ2]]− u2 [d∗ [λ1]] .
Assuming on the contrary that 0 > u1 [d∗ [λ2]] − u1 [d∗ [λ1]] yields also 0 >
u2 [d
∗ [λ2]]− u2 [d∗ [λ1]]. Multiplying the two last inequalities by λ2 and (1− λ2)
respectively, adding them and rearranging the terms leads to
λ2u1 [d
∗ [λ1]] + (1− λ2)u2 [d∗ [λ1]] > λ2u1 [d∗ [λ2]] + (1− λ2)u2 [d∗ [λ2]] ,
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which is a contradiction. Hence u1 is non-decreasing. The fact that u2 is non-
increasing can be proved in a similar way.
Proof of Theorem 9. Denote by Z (d, α) the vector of left-hand sides in equa-
tions (11), i.e. the partial derivatives of the modified payoffs in the game with
compensations. At α = 1, the Jacobian ofZ with respect to d is diag (h′1 [d1] , h
′
2 [d2]),
which is an invertible matrix since h′i [di] < 0. By the implicit function theorem
there is a unique solution d∗ [α] to (11), continuous in α for α in a neighborhood
of 1, which means that the first-order condition for Nash equilibrium is satisfied.
It follows by continuity that the second-order condition remains satisfied for α
near 1 such that d∗ [α] is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 10. Define
G (S) = S−h−11 [αw1 + (1− α)w1F [S]]+h−12
[
α−1w2 +
(
1− α−1)w2 (1− F (S))]
(18)
noting that the inverses exist for any real S due to the inequalities assumed in the
theorem. Then note that (13) is equivalent to G (S) = 0. Since G is continuous,
existence of a solution to this equation follows from the fact that
lim
S→−∞
G (S) = −∞− h−11 [αw1] + h−12 [w2] < 0,
lim
S→∞
G (S) = ∞− h−11 [w1] + h−12
[
α−1w2
]
> 0.
Proof of Theorem 11. Function arguments are omitted for brevity. Consider
again the function G defined in (18) in the proof of Theorem 10. The equilibrium
value of S [α] = d∗1 [α] − d∗2 [α] is defined implicitly by the equation G (S) = 0.
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We differentiate this with respect to lnα and aim to show that S ′ < 0. Rearrange
slightly to find that
h′2αw1 (1− F )+h′1α−1w2F =
(
h′1h
′
2 − h′2 (1− α)w1f − h′1
(
1− α−1)w2f)S ′.
The LHS of this equation is negative for any value of α, so we just need to show
that the parenthesis multiplying S ′ is positive. Suppose α ≥ 1 (the other case is
treated symmetrically), then
h′1h
′
2 − h′2 (1− α)w1f − h′1
(
1− α−1)w2f =
h′2 (h
′
1 − (1− α)w1f)− h′1
(
1− α−1)w2f > 0,
where the last inequality follows from noting that the second-order condition for
player 1 is that
h′1 − w1 (1− α) f ≤ 0.
C Travel time variability illustration
This section presents some travel time data collected in Stockholm, where an au-
tomatic license plate recognition system is in operation. The system uses cameras
installed on major arterial roadways throughout the Stockholm urban area. For
each pair of cameras, matched travel time observations are aggregated into 15-
minute averages for navigating any path between the two cameras. We identified
nine pairs of such paths, such that in each pair, both segments carry traffic toward
the city center and both share the same downstream location but have clearly dif-
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ferent upstream locations.
We use data from the peak periods, 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., and 3:30 p.m. to
6:00 p.m., and we include only weekdays during the months of September and
October, 2005 to 2007.
Table 1 shows the mean travel times (in seconds), standard deviations, and
coefficients of variation (CV ) for the two paths in each pair, followed by the
correlation coefficient between the two paths. The standard deviation and the
correlation are based on residual travel times computed by taking out the average
for each 15 minute period. This takes into account systematic variation in travel
time over the peak.
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Table 1: Variations and Correlations in Travel Times for Selected Pairs of Convergent
Paths, AM and PM Peak Periods
Case Peak Period µ1 µ2 σ1 σ2 CV1 CV2 ρ12
(min) (min) (min) (min) (%) (%)
A a.m. 4.38 4.76 1.78 2.67 40.6 56.0 0.116
p.m. 4.25 4.76 3.01 3.57 70.6 74.9 0.295
B a.m. 2.95 6.03 1.24 0.92 42.0 15.2 -0.425
p.m. 3.06 5.44 1.22 0.35 39.8 6.5 -0.133
C a.m. 2.73 3.35 0.71 1.50 26.2 44.9 0.158
p.m. 2.45 3.68 0.83 1.84 33.8 49.9 0.119
D a.m. 6.82 7.49 1.45 1.64 21.3 21.9 0.165
p.m. 5.49 4.81 1.17 0.50 21.3 10.3 0.067
E a.m. 7.26 4.88 1.34 0.79 18.4 16.1 -0.122
p.m. 8.86 6.29 2.71 1.15 30.6 18.3 0.121
F a.m. 3.55 3.63 0.70 0.32 19.8 8.7 -0.123
p.m. 5.48 3.66 2.21 0.58 40.4 15.7 -0.009
G a.m. 9.41 3.65 0.63 0.37 6.6 10.0 0.107
p.m. 9.56 3.76 0.56 0.64 5.9 17.0 0.055
H a.m. 3.39 9.47 0.76 0.70 22.3 7.4 0.285
p.m. 4.65 9.55 1.60 0.50 34.5 5.2 0.221
I a.m. 5.56 6.45 1.27 1.13 22.9 17.5 0.430
p.m. 6.21 8.79 1.51 2.43 25.0 27.7 0.086
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